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ESTABLISHING THE CAUSAL LINK IN ASBESTOS
LITIGATION: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH*
INTRODUCTION
In the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth
centuries, asbestos was one of the most widely used materials
in industrialized society. An inexpensive and fireproof
insulator, asbestos could be found in industrial sites, office
buildings and residential homes as well as automotive parts
and household appliances.' In fact in the twentieth century
alone, more than 30 million tons of asbestos were used.2 Many,
if not most, who worked in fields such as construction,
automotives and the like, were exposed to asbestos on a regular
basis. At the beginning of the twentieth century, numerous
studies emerged establishing a link between asbestos and lung
disease.3 With the passing of time, it became increasingly clear
that asbestos was in fact a dangerous carcinogen. Despite this
information, most companies continued their use of asbestos,4
02002 Simcha David Schonfeld. All Rights Reserved.
1 Laborers have used asbestos in the manufacture of more than three
thousand products. See Special Project: An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political
Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REV. 573, 578-79 nn.1, 7 (1983).
2 See Myra Paiewonsky Mulcahy, Note, Proving Causation in Toxic Torts
Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1299, 1303 (1983) (stating that by 1978, nearly thirty-
two million tons of asbestos had been used).
3 The earliest indication of a link between asbestos and lung disease dates
back to 1900 when Dr. H. Montague Murray, a British physician, found traces of
asbestos in the lungs of a thirty-three-year-old patient who died after working in an
asbestos-textile factory for fourteen years. See PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS
MISCONDUCT', THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 11 (1985). Additionally, by 1930,
articles on the dangers of asbestos appeared in medical journals of the United States,
Italy and France. BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 19
(4th ed., 1996). A 1943 report by Dr. Wilhelm C. Hueper suggested that lung cancer
and asbestos were closely related. Id. at 45.
4 In 1975, the annual report of Raybestos-Manhattan, a major asbestos
company, revealed in exquisite detail the fact that industry leaders were fully aware of
the dangers of asbestos as early as 1930 and explained the lengths to which they went
to suppress publication of said dangers in the trade journal. BRODEUR, supra note 3, at
107-13. See also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1106 (5th Cir.
1974) ("The unpalatable facts are that in the twenties and thirties the hazards of
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thus subjecting their employees to unspeakable danger. The
results have been nothing short of devastating. Many
employees of the manufacturing companies as well as others
down the distributive chain have serious physical illnesses
such as pleural thickening,5 asbestosis 6 and other respiratory
ailments. The most damaging of all diseases caused by asbestos
is mesothelioma,7 a deadly and almost incurable form of cancer.
Those who are diagnosed with the disease rarely live more
than a year and are ultimately subjected to a most painful
demise.8 The pain and suffering of both the victims and their
families is often compounded by the astronomical costs
associated with the medical treatments.9 Those most commonly
affected are former laborers and other blue-collar workers, who
are often of modest financial means and simply unable to
shoulder the enormous financial burden that accompanies their
illnesses. The thought of leaving their families in
working with asbestos were recognized ... [and] defendants issued no warnings until
1964-66, by which time adequate warnings would have come too late for [plaintiffl"). A
story that appeared on the front page of the Washington Post in 1978 detailed the
evidence that was uncovered during litigation which clearly indicated a deliberate
cover-up by the asbestos industry. The evidence included letters from asbestos
companies noting efforts to suppress the information about the dangers of asbestos as
early as 1934; documents indicating a refusal to accept the findings of medical
researchers, hired by the companies themselves, who concluded that asbestos was
dangerous to the employees; files indicating that personal injury suits were quietly
settled years before the knowledge of asbestos dangers was widespread; and files
indicating a company policy of not telling employees that their physical examinations
revealed signs of asbestosis. Bill Richards, New Data on Asbestos Indicate Cover-Up of
Effects on Workers, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1978, at Al.
5 Pleural thickening is the formation of calcified tissue on the "pleura" which
are the membranes surrounding the lungs. Despite the fact that pleural thickening is
detectable in x-rays and may develop into asbestosis or mesothelioma at a later time, it
has generally not been held to be a compensable injury. See, e.g., Simmons v. Pacor,
Inc., 674 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1996) (holding that pleural thickening was not a compensable
injury).
6 Asbestosis is a condition where there are actual particles of asbestos in the
lungs of the victim. It is accompanied by numerous physical symptoms such as
shortness of breath, chest pains and blood in the sputum. The disease was first
discussed in an article by British pathologist Dr. W.E. Cook in which he chronicled the
findings of an autopsy he conducted on a young woman who died after working for an
asbestos company for many years. See W.E. Cook, Pulmonary Asbestosis, 2 BRIT. MED.
J. 1024 (1927).
7 Mesothelioma is the formation of a malignant tumor either in the pleura-
the membrane that encases the lung, or in the peritoneum-the membrane that lines
the abdominal cavity. BRODEURsupra note 3, at 30.
8 See Roger R. Connelly et al., Demographic Patterns for Mesothelioma in the
United States, 78 J. NATVL. CANCER INST. 1053 (1987).
9 The medical costs associated with the treatment of asbestos victims runs in
the billions of dollars. See David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of
Asbestos-Carnage, Cover-Up, and Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1986) (book
review).
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insurmountable debt is understandably unacceptable to them.
Many victims have therefore turned to litigation as a means of
being properly compensated by the companies and
manufacturers responsible for their predicament.
What began as a trickle has turned into a flood and, in
recent years, court dockets have been filled with asbestos-
related litigation.1" In many instances, plaintiffs have
succeeded in recovering significant awards from the asbestos
manufacturers and many such companies have been forced into
bankruptcy.11  In other cases, however, recovery under
traditional tort law is difficult at best and frequently
unattainable. One such scenario is where the plaintiffs are
unable to identify any specific manufacturer as the cause of
their injuries.12 Even if the plaintiffs can prove conclusively
that their injuries are the result of exposure to asbestos, the
inability to correctly and definitively identify a defendant
makes recovery a virtual impossibility. 3 These cases often
conclude with an injured party who is unable to recover and a
negligent defendant who cannot be sued. Realizing this
dilemma, plaintiffs have attempted the use of numerous
alternative theories of liability, but with little success."
While there are many asbestos cases that pose complex
legal challenges, this Note will focus on the aforementioned
scenario which has proven to be most frustrating for both
litigants and the courts. Part I of this Note will describe the
legal framework under which these circumstances arise and
will discuss alternative theories of liability utilized in similar
10 Close to a quarter million asbestos lawsuits have been filed to date.
Matthew C. Stiegler, The Uncertain Future of Limited Fund Settlement Class Actions
in Mass Tort Litigation After Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 78 N.C. L. REV. 856, 857
(2000); see also Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999, H.R. 1283, 106th Cong.
§ 2 (1999) (stating that there are "more than 150,000 [asbestos related] lawsuits
currently pending in the tort system and tens of thousands of new cases filed every
year").
1 Companies claim to have paid more than $10 billion in settlements and as
a result, twenty six major corporations have filed for bankruptcy thus far. Quenna
Sook Kim, Asbestos Claims Continue to Mount, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2001, at B1.
12 One example is a mechanic who was charged with replacing failing
(asbestos-laden) brake pads but is unable to identify their makers because they were
entirely worn out at the time that he came in contact with them. See, e.g., Black v.
Abex Corp., 603 N.W.2d 182 (N.D. 1999).
13 See id. (rejecting plaintiffs attempted use of alternative theories of liability
and granting summary judgment to all defendants).
14 The two most commonly attempted theories are "market share liability"
and "alternative liability," both of which will be discussed in detail infra in Parts I.B
and I.C.
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situations, specifically the theories of market share liability
and alternative liability. Part II will explore why those
alternative theories of liability are not applicable to asbestos
litigation. Part III will discuss the public policy issues to be
considered in crafting an alternative method of determining
liability. In conclusion, this Note proposes a new approach to
prove causation and apportionment of damages in asbestos
litigation. Under the proposed theory, a plaintiff need only
prove that he had sufficient exposure to defendant's product to
give rise to a substantial likelihood that his injuries were
caused by defendant's conduct.' 5  Once this has been
established, plaintiff will be entitled to recovery of medical
expenses and attorney's fees incurred as a result of the
injuries. If adopted, this theory would ensure that the basic
needs of plaintiffs are met while only subjecting defendants to
judgments that are fair and in proportion to the probability of
fault.
PART I
A. The Problem
Prior to the twentieth century, asbestos was one of the
most commonly used materials in industrial manufacturing. As
the twentieth century unfolded, however, many people who had
previously worked with asbestos began suffering respiratory
disorders including various forms of lung cancer, and a
definitive link between the two began to emerge. 6 Despite the
mounting evidence demonstrating the dangers of asbestos,
industry leaders showed little interest in curtailing its use."
The dangers therefore remained and the associated illnesses
began to mount. As it became clear that industrial leaders
utilized asbestos despite full knowledge of its dangers, 8 those
who suffered from asbestos-related illnesses began to initiate
suits against the companies who manufactured the materials.
In all asbestos litigation, however, proof of causation is often
15 Because of the nature of asbestos products, the determination of whether
this requirement has been met will have to be made on a case-by-case basis as
explained infra note 63.
16 See supra note 3.
17 In fact, between the years of 1934 and 1964, the industrial use of raw
asbestos actually increased by 500% from 500,000 tons to 2,500,000 tons. Thomas E.
Willging, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION 10 (1987) (citations omitted).
See supra note 4.
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difficult. In some cases, courts have differed as to the level of
proof necessary for a plaintiff who, aside from asbestos
exposure, was also a smoker and now claims that he has
contracted lung cancer from the asbestos. 9 Even for non-
smokers, however, it is often difficult to prove that exposure to
any specific asbestos product was the cause of plaintiffs
injuries. Most asbestos plaintiffs were exposed to numerous
products and cannot conclusively prove that their injuries are
the result of one specific product over another.' To allow for
recovery in virtually any asbestos case, therefore, courts would
be required to relax the standard causation requirements.
Noting this dilemma, many courts have done just that.21 The
Eleventh Circuit requires only that a plaintiff prove exposure to
the asbestos-containing product whose maker he sues.2
Whether or not the injury was actually caused by that product
is of no interest to the court.2
Washington state as well as the Fifth Circuit have gone
even further by adopting the "job site test."' Under this
approach, plaintiff need only prove that the asbestos-
containing product was used at a job site simultaneous with his
employment.' However, a plaintiff need not prove that he
actually came in contact with the product at any time.2
The approaches taken by the courts in the above cases
illustrate the considerable difficulty virtually all asbestos
plaintiffs encounter in adequately proving causation. Despite
the fact that in all of those cases the identities of the
defendants were known and the plaintiff was undoubtedly
19 See, e.g., In re Manguno, 961 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1992).
See generally Mulcahy, supra note 2.
21 See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1103 (5th
Cir. 1974) (requiring that plaintiff need only prove that defendant's conduct
.contributed substantially" to plaintiffs injury but not that it actually caused the
harm).
22 Blackstone v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir.
1985).
Id. See also Lane v. Celotex Corp., 782 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1986)
(requiring the plaintiff to show that he was "directly exposed" to the defendant's
asbestos products); Lee v. Celotex Corp., 764 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir. 1985)
(requiring that the plaintiff prove that he was "directly exposed to th[e] defendant's
asbestos-containing product").
2 Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 722 P.2d 826 (Wash. App. 1986); see also
Richoux v. Armstrong Cork Corp., 777 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1985) (adopting the "job site
test" set forth in Lockwood).
25 See cases cited supra note 24.
Lockwood, 722 P.2d at 840 (agreeing with the trial court that "[n]o direct
evidence of specific product identification was necessary").
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exposed to their products, the nature of asbestos and the
resulting harm is such that proof of causation would not have
been feasible had the courts not relaxed the causation
requirements.
Where the identity of the defendant is unclear, proof of
causation becomes considerably more challenging. Very often,
the manner in which a plaintiff was exposed to asbestos was
such that he is unable to identify any specific company as
having been responsible for the manufacture of the products
that caused his injury.2 While the courts have demonstrated a
willingness to relax the level of necessary proof to
accommodate asbestos plaintiffs,2 a situation in which the
plaintiff is unable to definitively identify a defendant seems to
exceed the bounds of judicial generosity. Relaxing causation
requirements can only go so far.3° At the same time, the
inability to identify a defendant should not diminish the
validity of a claim. The fact remains that the plaintiff suffered
significant harm as the result of another party's negligent
conduct. Nonetheless, without a defendant recovery is
impossible. Such situations result in plaintiffs who are unable
to recover damages to which they should be entitled and
negligent companies escaping liability.
While plaintiffs have attempted to apply various novel
theories of liability, they have been met with great skepticism,
if not flat out rejection, by virtually all of the courts that have
been asked to apply them. To call this unfair would be most
The cases discussed supra Part II subsections A and B, that rejected the
alternative theories of liability, only addressed the issue because traditional causation
would not have worked. So, in essence, they all applied the traditional causation
requirements which is why the plaintiff lost once the alternative approaches were
rejected.
See Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987);
Black v. Abex Corp., 603 N.W.2d 182 (N.D. 1999); Vigiolto v. Johns-Manville Corp., 643
F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
See, e.g., In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 818 (9th Cir.
1992) (adopting 'the less restrictive approach to questions of asbestos causation
embodied in cases like Lockwood."); Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh, 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir.
1986) (requiring that an asbestos plaintiff prove the conduct of the defendant to have
been a "substantial factor" in causing his injuries); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir. 1974) (same); Lockwood, 722 P.2d 826 (applying
the job site test).
30 Legal scholars have cautioned against modifying causation requirements
without considerable justification. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A
Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1512 (1992) (concluding their section on "Alternative Liability" by stating that
"when defendant identification is possible, courts should be reluctant to abandon
traditional causation principles.").
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charitable. A system must be adopted in which the prohibitive
financial burdens of the victims are eased while the fairness in
apportionment of liability among the companies remains un-
compromised. Although neither party may be entirely satisfied,
a system in which the basic expenses of a blameless victim are
imposed upon those most likely responsible for the harm
should be acceptable to all. The fact remains that the conduct
of the defendant was precisely the type responsible for the
plaintiffs harm, and to hold them minimally liable is certainly
within reason. At the same time, the failure to establish a
definitive link between the plaintiff and defendant should
restrict the plaintiffs ability to recover any damages other than
medical expenses and attorney's fees. To date, the
establishment of a system fair to both plaintiffs and defendants
has proved to be a most daunting and elusive task. Courts
correctly reject the attempted application of existing modified
causation theories, because, as the following sections
demonstrate, the nature of asbestos litigation is such that it
requires an approach designed specifically for it. Such a theory
has thus far failed to emerge.
B. Market Share Liability
The dilemma of victims who cannot recover from
negligent defendants is not exclusive to asbestos litigation. In
1941, a drug known as diethylstilbesterol ("DES") was
produced and sold by various companies for the purpose of
preventing miscarriages. As DES use increased, so did reports
of birth defects among children whose mothers had taken the
drug during pregnancy. In 1971, the FDA ordered all
companies to cease production of DES and required them to
warn physicians that it no longer be administered to pregnant
women.3 1 In 1978, numerous parties who were injured as a
result of DES brought a class action suit.3 2 These plaintiffs
faced a problem quite similar to that faced by the asbestos
plaintiffs described above. Because of the manner in which the
drug was administered and the amount of time that had
elapsed, no plaintiff could identify the company that
manufactured or marketed the specific DES dose administered
to the expectant mother. While DES undoubtedly caused the
31 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
32 Id.
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birth defects, plaintiffs could not determine the identity of the
company that produced or administered the specific product.
The case, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,3 ultimately
reached the Supreme Court of California. Rather than bar
plaintiffs' suit on the grounds that causation could not be
proved against an unknown defendant, the court took a
different approach. In a landmark ruling, the court adopted a
new theory of liability which apportioned damages based on the
share of the market owned by a specific company at the time
that the injury occurred.' This novel approach has come to be
known as "market share liability." The court set the following
three criteria for recovery: (1) the manufacturer of the defective
product cannot be identified;5 (2) all defendants produced an
identical product; and (3) the named defendants represent a
substantial percentage of the market.36 Where these conditions
are met, each company will be liable to the extent of its market
share.
The predicament in which many asbestos plaintiffs find
themselves is similar to that of the DES plaintiffs. For a
variety of reasons including the passage of time and the
number of asbestos products to which plaintiffs were exposed,
38 Id.
lu The theory, based on the student note, DES and a Proposed Theory of
Enterprise Liability, is one grounded in sound logic. Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES
and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978). Since
its implementation is contingent upon the identification of defendants whose activities
were precisely those of the party actually responsible for the harm, the percentage of
the market that they owned at the time is likely to be indicative of the percentage of
overall liability to all victims, which they share with other responsible parties. This
theory is unlike any other in tort law in that it allows recovery from a group of
defendants despite the distinct possibility that none were responsible for the actual
harm suffered by the plaintiff. Mindful of that possibility, not all courts have greeted
this theory with untempered enthusiasm. See Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d
187, 190 (Ohio 1998) (stating that the possibility of imposing liability on a party not
responsible for the specific harm, "collides with traditional tort notions of liability by
virtue of responsibility, and imposes a judicially created form of industry-wide
insurance upon those manufacturers subject to market-share liability"); Wood v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 38 F.3d 510 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that market share liability is never
available under Oklahoma law based on Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062, 1067
(Okla. 1987) (rejecting market share liability because "the public policy favoring
recovery on the part of an innocent plaintiff does not justify the abrogation of the rights
of a potential defendant")). See also Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764
F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 533 F.
Supp. 183, 190 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (referring to market share liability as a "novel theory of
causation" and stating that its application in asbestos litigation would "raise serious
questions of fairness")).
If a defendant can be identified then it would follow that imposing liability
upon other parties would be unj ust.
See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980).
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the identification of a single company whose asbestos laden
products were used by the plaintiff is often not possible.
Understandably, many asbestos victims invited the courts to
apply the theory of market share liability. Unfortunately for
them, the invitation has been summarily declined.3 ' Given the
fact that market share liability is a substantial relaxation of
traditional causation requirements, some courts rejected its use
under any circumstances.3 However, even among those
jurisdictions that have considered market share liability in
DES cases, there has been great reluctance to expand its
application to asbestos litigation. 39 The difficulty in defining an
"asbestos market" and the wide range of risks posed by varying
levels of asbestos makes the application of market share
liability entirely inappropriate.4
C. Alternative Liability
While the Sindell decision marked a radical departure
from the traditional requirements of causation, it was not the
first to do so. In the oft cited case of Summers v. Tice,4' the
California Supreme Court faced a troubling set of facts. The
plaintiff sustained an eye injury when a single bullet struck
him after two hunters negligently fired their weapons in his
direction.' Determining which hunter fired the shot was not
possible, and the plaintiff was therefore unable to prove who
37 Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1990); White v.
Celotex Corp., 907 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1990); Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation
Co., 764 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Asbestos Litigation, 509 A.2d 1116 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1986); Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985); Leng v. Celotex
Corp., 554 N.E.2d 468 (Ill. 1990); Sholtis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 568 A.2d 1196 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691
(Ohio 1987); Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987); Gaulding v. Celotex
Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1989).
See, e.g., Sutowski v. Eli Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 1998); Wood v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 38 F.3d 510 (10th Cir. 1994).
See supra note 37 (collecting cases in which courts 'refused to apply market
share liability to asbestos litigation).
40 As explained in detail in Part II, there is no shortage of reasons why
market share liability is inappropriate for asbestos litigation. However the most
compelling argument against its application to asbestos cases is that unlike DES,
asbestos products vary greatly in their composition and the level of harm that they
cause. As a result, the share of the market that a particular company may have owned
is in no way indicative of the actual harm that resulted from its product. See, e.g.,
Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987); Celotex Corp. v.
Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1985).
41 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
42 Id.
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was responsible for his injury. Instead of naming one shooter
as a defendant, plaintiff initiated a suit against both. Realizing
that both defendants were negligent and that plaintiff suffered
great harm, the court created a new theory of recovery, which
has come to be known as "alternative liability."'
The alternative liability theory applies the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur to create an inference of negligence and to
shift the burden of proof to the defendants. 44 A plaintiff must
satisfy two prerequisites in order to proceed under this
approach: (1) all parties who could have been responsible for
the harm are named; and (2) all of the named defendants acted
tortiously." The rationale for Summers is that under such
circumstances, the defendants are in a better position to
determine what occurred than is the plaintiff.46 The fairness of
this approach is readily apparent. Where numerous parties act
wrongly and one or more causes the harm, the plaintiffs ability
to receive just compensation should not be hampered by the
technical difficulty of defendant identification.
The Summers ruling, like the DES decision that later
followed,47 was a departure from traditional principles of tort
law. The court adopted the alternative liability theory
expressly to assist plaintiffs who had little chance of success
under traditional causation requirements. Many asbestos
plaintiffs attempted to apply the theory of alternative liability
in situations that they deemed analogous. 48 Asbestos plaintiffs
argued that the burden of proof should be placed on the
defendant company as it was in Summers. 9 As with market
share liability, the courts unanimously rejected applying
Id.
44Id.
4Id.
46 This reasoning may not be that apparent under the facts of Summers since
it is quite possible that neither hunter had any greater understanding of what took
place than did the plaintiff. However in a 1944 California case that adopted the
Summers rule, the rationale was more obvious. In Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687
(Cal. 1944), plaintiff was injured while undergoing a medical procedure and sued the
entire surgical team that was tending to him. Considering the fact that plaintiff was
not conscious during the procedure, defendants were obviously better suited to
determine who specifically was responsible for the harm. As such, the court held that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applied and created an inference of negligence against
all of the defendants present during the surgery.
47 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (creating the theory of
market share liability) discussed supra Part I.B.
48 See, e.g., Goldman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987)
(discussed in detail infra Part II subsection B).
49 Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
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alternative liability to asbestos litigation."° In distinguishing
the asbestos plaintiff from the Summers plaintiff, the courts
have emphasized that in Summers it was known that both
named defendants acted tortiously towards the plaintiff and
that the harm resulted from one of them. In asbestos litigation,
however, the identity of all suppliers is often not known. Thus
it cannot be said with any degree of certainty that the harm
resulted from the actions of one of the named parties.51
The refusal of the courts to adopt either market share
liability or alternative liability has left an entire class of
legitimate asbestos victims without legal recourse. For those
unable to identify the company responsible for the product that
harmed them, the potential for recovery seems bleak.
Admittedly, the rejections of market share liability and
alternative liability have been judicially sound. The differences
between asbestos and DES are far more significant than the
similarities. While market share liability may have been fair in
the DES setting, it would lead to an unjust apportionment of
liability in asbestos litigation. The difficulty in determining an
asbestos market, as well as the great variance of dangers posed
by different asbestos products, makes apportionment of fault
based on "market share" an unjust approach. Additionally, the
inability of many asbestos plaintiffs to identify all of the
possible defendants responsible for the harm makes alternative
liability equally inappropriate.
While the exclusion of these theories may have served
the interests of justice, the interests of fairness suffered as a
result. In many circumstances, blameless asbestos victims
cannot recover for the damages that negligent actors inflicted
on them. A system must be adopted in which the basic needs of
the plaintiffs are served without unfairly jeopardizing
potentially innocent defendants. The Summers52 and Sindell
decisions were inspired by an appreciation for the judicial
50 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 30, at 1518 (noting that "even courts
that have embraced alternative liability.., have not done so in asbestos injury cases.").
See also Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983);
Marshall v. Celotex, 651 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Black v. Abex Corp., 603
N.W.2d 182 (N.D. 1999); Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997);
Gaulding v. Celotex, 772 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1989); Sholtis v. American Cyanamid Corp.,
568 A.2d 1196 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Nutt v. AC & S Co., 517 A.2d 690 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1986).
51 Goldman, 514 N.E.2d 691.
52 Summers, 199 P.2d 1.
63 Sindell, 607 P.2d 924.
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responsibility to greet troubling fact patterns with novel
approaches. The plight of asbestos victims should be met with
equal ingenuity. The courts should adopt an approach whereby
companies who acted negligently can be held liable for the
medical expenses of those who suffer as a result of conduct
such as theirs. This would ensure that the elementary needs of
asbestos victims are met, while not subjecting defendants to
the enormous awards that have accompanied previous asbestos
settlements. Under this system, the interests of both justice
and fairness would be well served.
PART II
A. The Rejection of Market Share Liability for the Asbestos
Plaintiff
The requirements that a plaintiff must meet in order to
employ the theory of market share liability seem to form a
harmonious blend of logic and justice. As stated by the Sindell
court, the only time that liability should be spread among
numerous parties is where the actions of those parties are
identical, making their consequences, therefore, comparable.'
Once a plaintiff establishes equal liability among defendants,
apportionment of liability based on a particular company's
share of the market is within reason. However, where the
defendants marketed products with varying levels of danger,
the percentage of the resulting damages cannot be measured
merely in proportion to the defendant's market share.- In such
cases, culpability can only be apportioned based on the nature
of each individual product and the amount of danger that it
posed. Needless to say, a product-specific analysis would be
entirely inconsistent with the principles upon which market
share liability was founded.
In asbestos litigation, many plaintiffs are faced with
situations analogous to that of Sindell. Often, a victim who
suffers from an asbestos related illness is unable to identify the
specific manufacturer responsible for his injuries. Plaintiffs
are then faced with an uphill battle with grim prospects.
Because a conventional attempt at recovery would fail without
an identified defendant, many plaintiffs turn to market share
5 Id. at 936.
55 Id.
See supra notes 34, 37-38 for examples.
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liability as an alternative approach. While the attempt may be
understandable, the requirements set forth by the Sindell court
have posed an insurmountable burden to these plaintiffs.
The first requirement of market share liability is that
the plaintiff be unable to identify any defendant.5" In asbestos
litigation this can often be difficult to satisfy. In 1985, a former
boilermaker who was diagnosed with asbestosis 58 filed suit
against sixteen defendant companies who produced asbestos-
containing boilers during the time that he was employed.59 The
plaintiff advanced market share liability among other
theories.60 The case ultimately reached the Florida Supreme
Court, which refused to apply market share liability.6' Citing
Sindell, the court ruled that since the plaintiff was able to
identify many manufacturers of the products to which he was
exposed, the very first requirement of market share liability
had not been satisfied.' 2
Considering the circumstances from which asbestos
suits arise, it is fairly common for this problem to exist. Most
asbestos plaintiffs were exposed to countless products and
materials in the course of their employments and will
invariably be able to name at least one company whose
products they used. This becomes a double-edged sword. A
plaintiffs ability to name a defendant undermines the first
element of the market share liability test, which requires that
plaintiff be unable to identify the specific defendant responsible
for the harm. Yet, the plaintiff lacks the ability to recover from
the named defendant directly since she cannot prove causation
against one company when she was exposed to countless other
products. A system must be adopted by which victims of
asbestos will not lose their ability to recover simply because
they can recall the maker of one or more of the many asbestos
products with which they had contact. If a plaintiff can prove
57 See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
68 See supra note 6 for an explanation of this disease.
Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533, 534-35 (Fla. 1985).
60 Id. at 535.
61 Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 537 ("We find that the market share theory is an inappropriate
vehicle with which to apportion liability for the asbestos-related injury in this cause.
Our holding is based principally upon the fact that Copeland was able to identify many
of the manufacturers of the products to which he was exposed."). See also Sholtis v. Am.
Cyanamid Corp., 568 A.2d 1196, 1204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) ("Plaintiffs here
(as in most asbestos cases) present a different situation, which as defendants properly
point out is not a true 'non-identification' case.").
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that he had considerable exposure' to a product that a specific
defendant manufactures, courts should compel that defendant
to cover plaintiffs medical expenses. The absence of a definitive
causal link should not relieve the defendant of all
responsibility. Despite the fact that causation may be unclear,
the named defendant's negligence is beyond question.6 Since
plaintiff suffered serious harm and defendant engaged in the
type of conduct that caused the harm, proof of considerable
exposure to the dangerous product should suffice to invite a
basic recovery of medical expenses. At the same time, plaintiffs
should not be entitled to the generous award that they would
receive had causation been fully proved.'
While the first Sindell requirement has proved
problematic, the others have been no less friendly to the
asbestos litigant. Many courts note that determining what
constitutes a "substantial percentage of the market" is rarely
feasible in asbestos cases.6 Considering the wide range of both
the quality and quantity of asbestos materials and the equally
varying levels of risk that accompany them, the identification
of an "asbestos market" is often an impossible task.7 For
example, a defendant who owned 50% of the market for boilers
but whose boilers contained only 5% of tightly packed asbestos,
cannot be said to have the same share of the "asbestos boiler"
market as the competing company that owned the remaining
The levels of exposure that would amount to "considerable exposure" will
have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The principal factors to be considered are
the dangers posed by the product based on the type and amount of asbestos and the
manner in which it was produced (loosely wrapped asbestos gives off considerably more
dangerous dust than tightly packed asbestos) as well as the amount of time that
plaintiff was exposed. The adoption of a general time frame would not be prudent
considering the various impacts of all of the variables.
64 As discussed infra Part III, the plaintiff will still have to prove that the
named defendant acted negligently in its production and marketing of the alleged
asbestos product.
66 The fact remains that some amount of causation could be said to have been
proven. Plaintiff does suffer from an injury caused by a prolonged exposure to a kind of
product which defendant produced. Nonetheless, only medical expenses and attorney's
fees, the most basic and necessary compensation, should be awarded considering the
weakened causal link that has been established.
See Goldman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987) (quoting
In re Asbestos Cases, 453 F. Supp. 1152 (N.D. Cal. 1982)) (rejecting application of
market share liability in asbestos litigation because, inter alia, "defining the relevant
product and geographic markets would be an extremely complex task due to the
numerous uses to which asbestos is put."); CelotexCorp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533,
538-39 (Fla. 1995) (stating that the varying levels of toxicity among asbestos products
makes the determination of what constitutes a "substantial share of the market" most
difficult).
67 As explained supra note 40.
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50% of the market but whose boilers contained 30% of loosely
packed asbestos. To view the market simply as that of
"asbestos boilers" would in no way represent the true nature of
the risks created by the competing products. The inability to
define the parameters of a specific market precludes any
attempt to determine what constitutes a substantial share of
that market. It is for those reasons that determining the
appropriate market of an asbestos product is a virtual
impossibility.
The market share requirement that has posed the
greatest difficulty to asbestos plaintiffs is that the named
defendant's products be identical or fungible.6 In Sindell, the
court put great emphasis on the fact that all DES doses were
manufactured from an identical formula and therefore posed
the exact same level of risk.69 While this may have been the
case with DES, it is emphatically not so in the asbestos
products arena. As an initial matter, the level of danger posed
by asbestos varies greatly among the different fibers that
exist.70 However, aside from the specific fibers used, many other
variables affect the dangers created by an asbestos product. In
explaining this fact, the Celotex court stated:
This divergence is caused by a combination of factors, including: the
specific type of asbestos fiber incorporated into the 'product; the
physical properties of the product itself; and the percentage of
asbestos used in the product. There are six different asbestos
silicates used in industrial applications and each presents a distinct
degree of toxicity in accordance with the shape and aerodynamics of
the individual fibers. Further, it has been established that the
geographical origin of the mineral can affect the substance's harmful
effects. A product's toxicity is also related to whether the product is
in the form of a solid block or a loosely packed insulating blanket
and to the amount of dust a product generates. The product's form
determines the ability of the asbestos fibers to become airborne and,
hence, to be inhaled or ingested. The greater the product's
susceptibility to produce airborne fibers, the greater the product's
potential to produce disease. Finally, those products with high
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980).
Id. (stating that use of market share liability was warranted because "all
defendants produced a drug from an identical formula") (emphasis added).
70 See Lee S. Siegel, Note, As the Asbestos Crumbles: A Look at the New
Evidentiary Issues In Asbestos-Related Property Damage Litigations, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1139 (1992) (citing testimony regarding the great variance in the levels of toxicity
and risk among different asbestos fibers).
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concentrations of asbestos fibers have corresponding high potentials
for inducing asbestos-related injuries.7'
Based on these inherent properties, it is clear that the
market share liability approach used in the DES case is wholly
inappropriate for asbestos litigation. The rationale underlying
market share liability is that the total percentage of harm
caused by any specific company is correlated to its percentage
of the market. This can only be the case where the products in
question posed the exact same level of threat. However, if the
products themselves vary in danger, the percentage of the
market share is in no way indicative of the percentage of
resulting harm.
The 1988 California Appellate Court case of Mullen v.
Armstrong World Industries2 provides one illustration of the
difficulties that product fungibility causes asbestos plaintiffs.
In Mullen, a group of plaintiffs, who sustained various injuries
from the presence of asbestos in their homes, filed suit against
more than forty companies that were engaged in the
manufacture or distribution of asbestos-containing products
during the time in which plaintiffs' homes were built (a period
beginning in 1912 and ending in 1978).73 Plaintiffs sought
recovery under the theory of market share liability. 74 The court
rejected plaintiffs' arguments and distinguished asbestos
products from DES on the matter of product fungibility. The
court stated that "[tihe briefest consideration demonstrates
numerous inherent differences between DES and asbestos,"75
including the great variance of dangers among asbestos
products noted in Celotex.S
As a result of the inability to satisfy any of the Sindell
requirements, the vast majority of courts have refused to apply
the theory of market share liability in asbestos litigation.77 The
71 Celotex, 471 So. 2d at 538.
72 246 Cal. Rptr. 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
73 Id.
4 Id.
' Id. at 36.
76 Id. (quoting Celotex, 471 So. 2d at 538).
Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1990); White v.
Celotex Corp., 907 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1990); Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation
Co., 764 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Asbestos Litig., 509 A.2d 1116 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1986); Celotex, 471 So. 2d 533; Leng v. Celotex Corp., 554 N.E.2d 468 (Ill. 1990);
Sholtis v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 568 A.2d 1196 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Goldman
v. Johns- Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987); Case v. Fibreboard Corp.,
743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987); Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1989).
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fact that most plaintiffs are able to name at least one
defendant, combined with the many factors that differentiate
asbestos products and the difficulty in defining an appropriate
market, has rendered the theory of market share liability
inappropriate for use in asbestos litigation. Additionally,
adopting market share liability would serve only to compound
one already weakened theory of causation by adding another.
As discussed above, traditional causation is rarely proven in
asbestos litigation and only a relaxation of the standards
invites recovery.78 The theory of market share liability is a
considerably greater modification of traditional causation
principles and applying it to an already relaxed causation
requirement would seem beyond the bounds of judicial
generosity. Therefore, a system should be enacted in which the
potential damages are limited so that they are awarded only in
proportion to the proof of causation.
An analysis of the relevant factors demonstrates
conclusively that application of market share liability in
asbestos litigation would be both morally unfair and legally
unjust. The level playing field that was essential to the Sindell
decision is entirely non-existent in the asbestos arena.
Considering the wide range of dangers that even the most
similar asbestos products pose, the courts' refusal to adopt the
theory of market share liability is most well founded.
B. The Rejection of Alternative Liability for the Asbestos
Plaintiff
The Summers court understood the great injustice that
would result had a person who fell victim to one of two
negligent actors been unable to recover despite naming both as
defendants. 9 While shifting the burden of proof from plaintiff
to defendant under the theory of alternative liability was a
departure from established legal precedent, it was a welcome
evolution of tort law.80 In adopting alternative liability, the
court in essence stated that plaintiff satisfied his burden of
78 See supra Part I subsection A.
79 Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
80 See, e.g., Patricia A. Meagher, Note, Market Share Liability: A New Method
of Recovery for D.E.S. Litigants, 30 CATH- U. L. REV. 551 (1981); Note, Market Share
Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1981); but
see Cynthia L. Chase, Note, Market Share Liability: A Plea for Legislative Alternatives,
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 1003 (criticizing market share liability as difficult to administer
and unfair to manufacturers of potentially hazardous materials).
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proof and it was for the negligent defendants to finish the job.8 1
Many asbestos litigants who were unable to name a specific
defendant responsible for their injury believed that their
situations were analogous to the Summers case and therefore
advocated the application of alternative liability. However,
plaintiffs were alone in that belief and the courts have refused
to apply alternative liability to asbestos litigation. 2
A 1987 Ohio Supreme Court case, Goldman v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp.,8 clearly articulated the argument
against application of alternative liability in asbestos litigation.
In 1980, a former bakery employee, who was exposed to
numerous asbestos products over a period of almost twenty
years, died from mesothelioma.' A fire destroyed the bakery
twenty years prior to decedent's death. As a result of both the
fire and the passage of time, the plaintiff was unable to identify
any of the companies responsible for the manufacture or sale of
the asbestos products." Mindful of the inability to file suit
based on the traditional principles of tort law, the plaintiff
proposed liability based, inter alia, on the theory of alternative
liability.8 However, the trial court refused to apply alternative
liability because the plaintiff "[was] unable to show that any of
the defendants remaining in this case supplied any asbestos
products to [decedent's employer]."' In affirming the decision,
the Ohio Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who wishes to
shift the burden of proof to the defendant through use of
alternative liability must first prove: (1) two or more
defendants committed tortious acts; and (2) plaintiffs injury
was the proximate result of one of the defendants' actions."8
The court noted that plaintiff failed to meet either
81 Summers, 199 P.2d at 4.
See Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983);
Marshall v. Celotex, 651 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997); Nutt v. AC & S Co., 517 A.2d 690 (Del. Super. Ct.
1986); Black v. Abex Corp., 603 N.W.2d 182 (N.D. 1999); Sholtis v. Am. Cyanamid
Corp., 568 A.2d 1196 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Gaulding v. Celotex, 772 S.W.2d
66 (Tex. 1989).
83 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987).
Id. Plaintiff alleged the presence of asbestos in the pipe insulation, ceiling
board, oven lining, oven covering, wallboard, sheeting and gloves.
85 The plaintiff was the decedent's widow.
8 Plaintiff also attempted use of market share liability, which failed for the
reasons discussed infra Part II. subsection A.
87 See Goldman, 514 N.E.2d at 691 (quoting the lower court's decision).
88 Id. at 696 (quoting Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co., 473 N.E.2d 1199 (Ohio
1984)).
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requirement. The plaintiff offered no evidence indicating that
any of the named companies actually furnished asbestos
products to the bakery at any time.89 A defendant who supplied
no products to the plaintiff cannot be said to have acted
tortiously.9° It follows then that the plaintiff failed to meet the
second requirement as well. Where "[tihere is no evidence that
any remaining defendant furnished any asbestos product" 9' to
the plaintiff, to find that plaintiff was injured as a proximate
result of one of the defendants is quite obviously impossible.
Furthermore, even if plaintiff had been able to identify one or
more companies that supplied asbestos products to decedent's
employer, there is no certainty that any of those specific
products resulted in the harm. In fact, the Goldman court
stated that considering the great number of companies who
have marketed asbestos products in the past, "the only way to
make sure that the guilty defendant was before the court would
be sue all asbestos companies."92 Finally, based on the text of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts in which alternative liability
was detailed, the court noted that considering the wide range of
risks associated with asbestos products, alternative liability
was not appropriate.9
The Goldman opinion is not one that is limited to the
specific facts of that case and will indeed hold true in virtually
all asbestos litigation. Only where a plaintiff is able to identify
all of the companies that supplied asbestos products with
which he had contact can either of the requirements can be
met. Additionally, even in the rare instances where plaintiff
can identify all possible defendants, unless the products
present a similar level of risk, the theory would still be
inapplicable. It is quite understandable why the courts have set
these rigid requirements. If a court is going to take the unusual
step of imposing the burden of proof on the defendants, it must
be certain that the culpable party is in its midst. Since
alternative liability creates an inference of guilt on the named
parties, the requirement that each named party must have
89 Goldman, 514 N.E.2d at 698.
90 The term "acted tortiously" as used by the court is somewhat of a
misnomer. While for the purposes of alternative liability the tortuous conduct must
have been directed at plaintiff specifically (as was the case in Summers), this should
not be construed to imply that the marketing of a dangerous product to the general
public is not to be considered as having "acted tortiously."
91 Id. at 696-97 (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 697.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 cmt. h (1965)).
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acted tortiously toward the plaintiff is understandable if not
imperative. It is clear, therefore, why the vast majority of
courts have rejected the application of alternative liability in
asbestos cases.9
While there have been rare occasions in which
alternative liability was employed in asbestos litigation, the
fact patterns in those cases are distinguishable from the cases
in which the theory was rejected. For example, in Menne v.
Celotex Corp.9 the plaintiff was able to identify all of the
products to which he was exposed and was able to demonstrate
that the named defendants had produced and supplied those
products to his employer.6 As a result, both requirements of
alternative liability were satisfied. All named defendants had
engaged in tortious behavior by supplying asbestos products to
plaintiffs employer, and the injuries sustained by plaintiff
were the result of at least one of the defendants if not all. Cases
such as Celotex are not those for which this Note seeks a
remedy. Indeed, similar fact patterns have led other courts to
allow recovery using alternative liability.' However, those
cases are the exception. Instances in which plaintiffs are
unable to identify the manufacturers responsible for their
injuries are far greater in number. In those cases, plaintiffs
seem to be without any sound legal recourse. An alternative
approach should be adopted to ensure that these plaintiffs are
not deprived of their ability to secure a fair judgment. The
approach should ensure that plaintiffs are adequately
compensated while imposing liability on defendants that is
proportionate to their fault.
PART III
As discussed above, many plaintiffs are unable to secure
judgments against asbestos companies because they lack the
ability to identify the company or companies responsible for
their injuries. Attempted applications of alternative theories of
See Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983);
Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 651 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Black v. Abex Corp., 603
N.W.2d 182 (N.D. 1999); Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997);
Gaulding v. Celotex, 772 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1989); Sholtis v. Am. Cyanamid Corp., 568
A.2d 1196 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1989); Nutt v. AC & S Co., 517 A.2d 690 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1986).
9 641 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Kan. 1986).
N Id.
9 See, e.g., Gard v. Raymark Indus., 229 Cal. Rptr. 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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liability have been rebuffed by the courts and for sound judicial
reasons. At the same time, however, as a matter of public
policy, a system must be adopted in which such plaintiffs are
not left entirely without recourse. These individuals suffered
great harm at the hands of numerous negligent companies and
should not be left to shoulder the accompanying financial
burden alone.
While the specific theories articulated by the Sindell
and Summers courts are inapplicable to asbestos litigation, the
philosophical approaches underlying those decisions can lead to
a solution in the asbestos arena as well. In endorsing the
application of market share liability, the Sindell court stated
that "[tihe response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly
to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such
products, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing
needs."9 The Sindell court opted for the latter approach, and
courts hearing asbestos litigation should be equally willing to
fashion new remedies. Asbestos plaintiffs are often faced with
fact patterns by which they would be unable to recover under
the traditional principles of tort law. As was the case in
Summer and Sindell, if the courts "adhere rigidly to prior
doctrine" recovery would be barred and an injustice would
result. Asbestos courts should follow the examples set by
Summers and Sindell and adopt alternative approaches that
would broaden the ability of such plaintiffs to recover without
jeopardizing the fairness in its application to the defendants.
The adoption of market share liability and alternative liability
are indicative of the fact that such solutions can be crafted.
The difficulty in designing a new theory of liability is
not to be understated. The competing fairness interests of
plaintiffs and defendants would appear on the surface to be
irreconcilable. On the one hand, there is a plaintiff who was
injured as a result of industry-wide negligence and is left with
enormous physical, emotional and financial suffering. Forcing
such a plaintiff to shoulder that burden alone seems entirely
unacceptable. On the other hand, the imposition of liability on
random defendants, none of which were identified as having
supplied any products, which caused plaintiffs harm, would
seem equally unjust. The appropriate approach utilizes a
balance of plaintiffs and defendant's interests resulting in a
system that will advance the interest of justice without
98 Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980).
20021
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
compromising the interest of fairness. The appropriate test
should be: (1) considerable exposure to an asbestos product; (2)
naming a defendant who marketed the product; (3) likelihood
that the plaintiffs employer used the product; and (4) that the
defendant negligently produced and manufactured the asbestos
product.
A system that is fair to both plaintiffs and defendants
will consist of two components: (1) a modification of causation
requirements and (2) a limitation of the potential for recovery.
To satisfy proof of causation under this theory, a plaintiff
would have to meet four requirements.
A. Causation
In order to establish a satisfactory causal link between
the actions of the defendant and the harm to the plaintiff, four
requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must prove that
he had considerable exposure to a specific kind of asbestos
product or products.9 While studies have demonstrated that
even short-term exposure to asbestos can cause lung disease,"
it is clear that the danger posed by asbestos is proportionate to
the length of the exposure.'01 As a result, the longer the
exposure, the greater the chance that it caused the plaintiffs
injuries. By proving considerable exposure to the asbestos
product, the plaintiff will have demonstrated a substantial
likelihood that the asbestos product was the cause in fact of the
harm. The satisfaction of this requirement will serve to ensure
that a causal link between the asbestos product or products
and plaintiffs injuries is likely to exist.
Second, plaintiff must prove that the named defendant
marketed the specific kind of product or products alleged to
have caused the harm during the time period in which the
plaintiff was exposed to tlhem. Satisfaction of this requirement
will indicate that the defendant is responsible for injuries such
As explained supra note 63, there can be no bright line rule as to what
would constitute considerable exposure because of the numerous factors to be
considered. The determination would have to made on a case-by-case basis.
100 See GEORGE A. PETERS & BARBARA J. PETERS, 1 SOURCEBOOK ON
ASBESTOS DISEASE: MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS B 19 (1980).
1 It is beyond question that the risk of asbestos-caused disease is
proportionate to the exposure. See Susan L. Barna, Abandoning Ship: Government
Liability for Shipyard Asbestos Exposures, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1034, 1041 (1992) (noting
that "[aisbestosis is 'dose-related' in that the incidence of disease is directly related to
the duration and intensity of exposure") (citations omitted).
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as those from which the plaintiff suffers. If the defendant
marketed the same products that caused the harm to the
plaintiff, it can be reasonably inferred that the products
resulted in injuries to others as well.
Third, the plaintiff must prove that, considering the
market in which defendant's products were sold, it is likely
that those products were used by his employer. °2 Although this
theory advocates a modified form of causation in which the
plaintiff need not prove that the defendant actually caused the
harm, this should not be construed to mean that the plaintiff
need not prove any causation at all. This element will serve to
ensure a strong possibility that the defendant was in fact
responsible for the plaintiffs harm.
Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant was
negligent in its production and marketing of the alleged
asbestos products. Despite the plaintiffs weakened burden of
causation, this foundational element of any action in tort
cannot be diluted. Regardless of how strong the causal link
may be, if the defendant cannot be shown to have acted
negligently then the plaintiff will be without an actionable
claim.
A plaintiff who succeeds in satisfying the four elements
of causation under this theory will have accomplished three
feats. First, he will have succeeded in proving that his injuries
were the result of exposure to asbestos. Second, he will have
shown that by negligently marketing the kind of products that
caused his injury, the defendant is responsible for causing the
kinds of injuries from which he suffers. Finally, the plaintiff
will have established a significant likelihood that the
defendant was in fact responsible for his specific injuries. This
will serve to demonstrate that the plaintiff was injured as the
result of the negligent conduct of another party and that the
defendant engaged in the type of negligent conduct that caused
the harm.
102 The purpose of this requirement is to preclude inclusion of random
manufacturers of such products. For example, a company that only sold the products in
California would likely fall outside of this requirement for a New York based plaintiff
since it is highly unlikely that those products were actually used by the New York
employer.
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B. Damages
Considering that traditional causation requirements
have been relaxed under this approach, the damages to be
awarded must follow suit. As a matter of public policy as well
as from a purely practical standpoint, the most crucial concern
is that a plaintiffs medical expenses be removed from his list of
worries. Where a financial burden is created as the result of
the negligent actions of another, the victim should not be made
to shoulder that burden alone. Under this approach, a plaintiff
who satisfies the causation elements will be entitled to a
recovery of all medical expenses associated with his asbestos-
related illnesses. However, considering the failure to establish
a definitive causal link between the plaintiff and the
defendant, it would be unfair to allow recovery of punitive
damages or pain and suffering. As a result, the financial
burden of the victim is transferred to a guilty party °u but that
party will not be forced to pay any more than is absolutely
necessary to remedy the harm suffered by the plaintiff. Under
this scheme, the possibility of contributory negligence on the
part of the plaintiff need not be considered. Even if the plaintiff
engaged in risky behavior such as smoking or other potentially
cancer-causing activities, the limited nature of the damages
ensures that he will not be recovering funds to which he is not
entitled. That is, if he were seeking to be fully compensated
then fairness would dictate that the award be reduced to reflect
his level of culpability. However, since the award has already
been drastically reduced, it is safe to assume that any
adjustment that would have been necessary to reflect his
contributory negligence has already been made.
While the recovery of medical expenses alone may be
ideal, from a purely practical standpoint, any system in which
attorney's fees are not imposed on the defendant company is
one that will fail the test of reality. Most asbestos cases are
tried by attorneys on a contingency fee basis,' ° and considering
103 A fundamental rationale for this approach is the understanding that
regardless of whether the named defendant actually caused the harm to this plaintiff,
it still acted negligently and caused similar injuries. The defendant is not free of guilt
in any sense of the term.
104 In fact studies have shown that up to one half of asbestos settlements have
gone towards the payment of attorney's fees. See Genine C. Swanzey, Using Class
Actions to Litigate Mass Torts: Is there Justice for the Individual?, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 421, 429 (1998) ("Of every dollar spent in asbestos litigation, clients receive
thirty-nine percent, while attorneys receive between one-third and one-half of the
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the limited nature of the awards under this approach, it would
not be profitable for a plaintiffs attorney to take such a case on
a contingency basis. As a result, few plaintiffs would succeed in
obtaining legal counsel, and the underlying motivation for this
approach would not be realized since the plaintiffs in question
would continue to go uncompensated. Including attorney's fees
in the recovery provides a financial incentive for attorneys to
represent these plaintiffs and at the same time would likely
result in a quicker resolution of the case by the named
companies.
One element conspicuously absent from this approach is
an analysis of the market share owned by the named
defendant. Under this theory, once the causation elements are
satisfied, the judgment can be obtained in its entirety from the
named defendant. The rationale behind this theory is that
considering the limited nature of the awards, requiring
plaintiff to conduct exhaustive research as to the components of
the market at the time of the exposure would be imprudent. To
compensate for this efficiency, the named defendant company
may implead any other company whom it can prove satisfies
the four criteria listed above. Once that is accomplished, the
damages awarded will be apportioned based on the share of the
market that the companies had in respect to each other.'0
5
Additionally, unlike market share liability, the ability of a
plaintiff to name minor defendants will not preclude
application of this theory. Even if a plaintiff can identify a
company as having supplied asbestos products, if the exposure
to that company's product was not sufficient to warrant a tort
action, plaintiff can still proceed against other defendants
under this approach.
On the surface, the theory proposed by this Note may
seem vulnerable to the criticism that it will impose
unacceptably high legal bills on the defendant corporations.
That is, when numerous companies may have been the culprit
but only one of them is named in the suit, the named defendant
will be compelled to expend additional financial and legal
resources to research and ultimately implead the other
awards in attorney's fees.") (citations omitted).
10 This is unlike market share liability in that the companies are judged in
comparison to each other and not in comparison to the entire market. If company A
sold twice as much of the named product as company B, liability will be apportioned on
a ratio of 2:1 regardless of the total share of the market that was owned between both
of them. The public policy considerations as well as the nature and size of the awards
allow for this leeway in apportioning the damages.
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negligent parties. In truth, however, the economic realities of
the nature of the damages ensure that this scenario will never
arise.
Considering the limited nature of the total damages
available to the plaintiff, a defendant corporation would have
no incentive to invest considerable capital in trying to mitigate
the amount that they are forced to pay. Where the negligence
of another corporation is easily proved, it would then be
efficient to implead them. However, if the implication of other
defendants would require the named defendant to invest
considerable amounts in legal fees, a simple cost-benefit
analysis would preclude their doing so.
CONCLUSION
A system must be adopted in which plaintiffs who are
unable to identify the asbestos manufacturer responsible for
their injuries can still obtain a basic recovery. The appropriate
approach employs a four-part causation test to establish a
considerable causal link between the negligent acts of a
particular defendant and the injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
Once the elements are satisfied, plaintiff would be entitled to
medical expenses and attorney's fees. The implementation of
this approach would be fair to all parties involved. Plaintiffs'
medical needs would be taken care of and their access to
counsel would not be compromised. Negligent defendants
would be forced to shoulder the financial burdens created as a
result of their tortious conduct, without being subjected to the
more costly awards often granted when causation is fully
proven.' °6 If followed, this theory will bolster the interest of
justice by ensuring that the financial burden created by
negligent conduct is shouldered by those responsible for it,
rather than by its victims. At the same time, the interest of
fairness would not be compromised, since the limited nature of
10 Jury awards to asbestos plaintiffs have run in the tens, if not hundreds of
millions of dollars. See, e.g., A Big Win in the Cradle of Asbestos Lawsuits, NAVL L. J.
Feb. 4, 2002, at C4. (discussing a Texas jury award of $130 million); Margaret Cronin
Fisk, A Fight Over Who Knew What, When, About Asbestos, NAV'L L.J. Feb. 19, 2001, at
C4. ($52 million). A story that appeared in the Washington Post more than ten years
ago, put the average jury award in New York asbestos cases at $2 million. Sharon
Walsh, 2,000 Asbestos Cases Settled in New York; Victims, Families to Get $300 Million
From Nearly 100 Firms, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1992, at C1.
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the awards ensures that they are proportionate to the case
against the defendant.
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